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COGNITIVE TUNNELING, AIRCRAFT-PILOT COUPLING DESIGN ISSUES AND SCENARIO
INTERPRETATION UNDER STRESS IN RECENT AIRLINE ACCIDENTS
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Eugenio L. Facci
Department of Psychology
University of Central Florida
Razia V. Nayeem
Department of Psychology
University of Central Florida
By building upon a number of accident reports and on cognitive psychology literature, this paper addresses the
effect of stress on the reasoning abilities and on the perceptual processes of pilots. We examine several cases,
including American Airlines 587 (New York, 2001), United Airlines 173 (Portland, 1978), KLM 4508 (Tenerife,
1977), Northwest Airlines 6231(Thiells NY, 1974), and Eastern Airlines 401 (Everglades, 1972), in which pilots
have, or may have, contributed to an accident by incorrectly interpreting the unfolding scenario, and specifically by
disregarding alternative interpretations of the unfolding scenario. While current research efforts have yet to provide
guidance on how to successfully handle the problems discussed in this paper, examination of prior accidents may
shed some light on the issue.
Introduction
Operator performance under stress is a topic that has
been under scrutiny for decades. In an environment
in which operational settings contain a range of
stressors, it is important to understand the effects of
these stressors on operator performance in order to
compensate for the possible decrements that result.
One specific operational setting which has been
prominent in this field is the aircraft cockpit. Aircraft
pilots are faced with an array of stressors, ranging
from environmental stressors to which they are
routinely exposed and trained to endure, to those
associated with emergency situations. Although
there has been extensive research in the field,
creating situations in which equivalent stress is
produced has proven quite difficult if not impossible.
The levels of stress induced, though probably lower
than those with which a pilot would be faced during
an emergency, have proven successful in detecting
effects on pilot/operator performance.
Some
conflicting data have resulted; however, enough
studies have come to the same conclusion that stress
can have negative effects on operator/pilot
performance in several different modes (Wickens, et
al., 1993), (Driskell, et al., 1999), (Barnett &
Wickens, 1986 as cited by Wickens et al., 1993).
Research has indicated that the arousal of stress may
severely disrupt a pilot’s ability to objectively
evaluate the situation with which he is faced.
1

Specifically, cognitive tunneling can occur.
Cognitive tunneling is a phenomenon in which a pilot
will not adequately perceive all pertinent information
because of filtering based on preexisting
expectations, initial impressions or other undefined
factors. This increases the likelihood that sensorial
stimuli and alternative scenario interpretations would
only be considered if consistent with these preexisting expectations.
While there is limited
experimental data on the effects of stress equivalent
to that experienced during a flight emergency,
aviation safety records provide examples of this
phenomenon. There are limitations to studying
cognitive tunneling through post hoc analysis of
accidents: it is subject to 20/20 hindsight and
provides limited basis for generalization and
prediction (Wickens et al., 1993). However analysis
through experimental research has its disadvantages
as well: it is difficult to achieve the level of stress that
operators would face in an emergency. That is why it
may be useful to explore this phenomenon through
both approaches. In the following sections, the
effects that stress has been found to have on
operator/pilot performance will be examined, and
several flights resulting in aircraft accidents will be
reconstructed to explore the effect that stress had on
the respective flight crews. The goal of this paper is
to fill in some of the gaps left open by research with
the archival analysis of previous accidents.
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Cognitive Tunneling and its Cohorts
Cognitive tunneling has been recognized for years as
a threat to operators who are faced with difficult
decisions in the midst of an emergency. It is one of
the many theories that surround decision making
under stress. It does not act alone, however.
Cognitive tunneling, sometimes referred to as
attention narrowing, works in conjunction with
several other phenomena that may collectively
severely affect an operator’s decision-making. The
effects of these phenomena are cumulative, and as
each occurs, the detrimental effect of the previous is
often increased.
Consequently, the operator is
typically left with a decreasing amount of relevant
information with which to work, more puzzling
phenomena, and an increasing load on her/his
cognitive processes. Wickens et al. (1993) present a
model which provides an effective illustration of the
stages of the decision-making process and the effects
that stress has on each. This is the paradigm through
which the phenomenon will be examined.
Cue Perception
The first stage, cue perception, is the first phase
affected by stress. In most operational environments,
there are numerous cues that must be considered
when performing the required tasks. When operators
are faced with a stressful situation, there is a
tendency for the reduction in number of cues that are
sampled and therefore perceived (Wickens & Flach,
1988). This selective allocation is referred to as
selective attention, and while it is beneficial from a
time/resource management point of view, operators
sometimes allocate their attention poorly. There are
many factors that can influence the distribution of
attention, including reliability of the cue, saliency of
cue, past experience with the cue, operator’s preexisting expectations and potential outcomes
associated (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Hence,
pilots will pay for instance most attention to blinking
lights or sounding alarms or to gauges confirming
their initial interpretation of a problem. However,
there are contradictory stances on the impact that
stress has on selective attention. It has been
theorized that stress actually improves selective
attention. Chajut & Algom (2003), along with
several others, have found that by imposing stress on
an operator, she/he is better able to focus on the
target task and rule out irrelevant cues. This is not
entirely contradictory to the theory being presented
herein. Stress decreases attention resources, and,
therefore, greater efficiency is achieved by not
sampling irrelevant cues and focusing on those
deemed relevant to the problem. However, some of

the cues deemed irrelevant are sometimes relevant,
and the “efficiency” achieved comes at the price of
embracing an incorrect interpretation of the unfolding
scenario.
Working Memory
In the next phase of the model, the hypotheses stored
in long-term memory are accessed and those assumed
to be relevant are placed in working memory for
evaluation. Additional narrowing can occur at this
phase. While several hypotheses are stored in long
term memory, only those associated with the
preexisting expectations and the presumed problem
will be retrieved, omitting several possible
alternatives. Operators will then likely fixate on
these hypotheses. Also, a function of working
memory is the evaluation of action outcomes which
are also retrieved from long-term memory. Increased
stress places greater demands on this already
“fragile” working memory, which degrades decision
making (Wickens, et al., 1993). Hence, when pilots
are faced with emergency situations, instead of
evaluating all hypotheses learned in training and
through experience, and thoroughly evaluating each,
pilots evaluate the hypothesis they believe to be
relevant with limited consideration of action
outcomes.
The Cohorts
There are many issues that work hand in hand with
cognitive tunneling to add to the effects of stress.
One of these partners is confirmation bias, which
occurs when an operator forms a premature
hypothesis and seeks out cues and information to
support solely this hypothesis (Wickens & Hollands,
2000). Many times operators believe they know what
is causing the problem before they have even
considered all the options, and instead of collecting
information to test all of the hypotheses, they collect
only information pertaining to the presumed cause.
The operator is then left with a small set of
information with which to work. When this
information does not add up and confirmation of the
hypothesis is not possible, further potential
confirming cues are usually sought, while
disconfirming information is usually not considered the operator tends to perseverate.
Belief
perseverance, another collaborator, takes place when
a person continues with a familiar plan of action even
though it is fruitless (Ross & Lepper, 1980).
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Expert vs. Novice
There has been extensive research in the area of
cognitive
tunneling
regarding
expert/novice
differences. Deitch (2002) found that one of the most
obvious differences in this area was cognitive
mapping, where experts had more sophisticated
cognitive maps and could relate their maps to more
specific scenarios than novices. Other studies have
found that there is a difference between experts and
novices for instrument fixation, a task thought to be
linked closely to cognitive processes (Harris, Tole,
Stephens, & Ephrath, 1982). Additionally, in some
tasks, experts even utilized different brain regions
than novices (Peres et al., 2000). However, Guilkey
(1997) determined that when pilots are faced with
especially cognitively exhausting problems, flight
time (experts vs. novices) is not a good predictor of
performance. Results from this study indicated that
no matter the strategy used, experts’ performance
was equal to novice performance. From these
differing results, one can see that there are still many
areas in cognition with respect to expert/novice
differences to be researched; however, the evidence
points to the problem of cognitive tunneling as one
which faces both novice and expert pilots alike.
In the following section, the above theories are
expounded upon through exploration of their
presence in several aircraft accidents. By illustrating
the existence of these phenomena in reality, not just
in a simulator setting, compelling support is provided
for these theories.
Aircraft Accidents
In this section, we examine five accidents in which
the phenomenon of cognitive tunneling most likely
played a significant role.
•

American Airlines 587, Belle Harbor, NY,
November 12th 2001 – As the flight was
cleared for takeoff, the first officer - the flying
pilot - asked the captain whether he thought
sufficient distance had been allowed from the
preceding plane, a large Japan Airlines
aircraft, in order to avoid wake turbulence.
The captain stated “aah…yeah...we’ll be
alright once we get rolling; he’s supposed to
be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s
the idea”. Shortly after takeoff the plane
encountered wake turbulence, to which the
first officer responded with strong aileron
inputs. Immediately after the encounter the
captain stated: “Little wake turbulence, huh?”,
to which the first officer replied “Yeah”. After

a few more seconds, a second wave of wake
turbulence was encountered, to which the first
officer reacted with strong rudder and aileron
inputs. His aggressive action on the flight
controls caused the plane to experience
significant lateral oscillation, which the first
officer erroneously attributed to wake
turbulence. As a result, he continued his
action on the flight controls, causing the plane
to experience increasing side loads and
resulting in the loss of the tail and the engines..
Throughout the accident flight, the first officer
seemed to be convinced that wake turbulence
would be encountered, and that some type of
action may be needed. Records indicated that
the first officer’s preoccupation with wake
turbulence was not limited to the accident
flight, as he had showed strong reactions to
wake turbulence in earlier occasions.
•

United Airlines 173, Portland, OR, December
28th 1978 – As the aircraft approached the
arrival airport, a problem arose with the
landing gear extension. As the gear was
lowered, the crew heard a loud “thump,
thump,” and the airplane yawed to the right.
The only gear lights that came on were those
indicating the nose gear was down and locked.
The flight crew elected to assess the problem
while in a holding pattern. However, the fuel
level was not adequately monitored, and fuel
starvation occurred, which caused the plane to
crash before reaching the airport. About one
hour elapsed between the time the problem
with the gear emerged and the time of the
crash. The flight engineer was monitoring the
state of the fuel throughout the last segment of
the flight and voiced concern to the captain.
The flight engineer even stated the amount of
fuel, which, considering the fuel burn rate,
gives a clear estimate on the amount of time
until the fuel would be depleted. However, the
captain continued on a path that would keep
them in the air longer than the fuel supply
allowed. The NTSB determined that the
probable cause
of the accident was the
failure of the captain to properly monitor the
aircraft’s fuel state and to properly respond to
the low fuel state and the crewmember’s
advisories regarding fuel state (1979). This
resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines. The
inattention resulted from preoccupation with a
landing gear malfunction and preparations for
a possible landing emergency (NTSB, 1979).
The only cues being considered were those
associated with the landing gear, despite the
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dire fuel situation. The captain was unable to
successfully process the information regarding
the fuel state because his attention resources
were exhausted dealing with the landing gear
problem.
•

KLM 4508, Tenerife, March 27th 1977 –
Numerous flights were diverted to Tenerife
after the Las Palmas Airport closed because of
a terrorist attack. The sudden increase in traffic
caused congestion at Tenerife so that a KLM
Boeing 747 was forced to wait two hours,
while another plane, which blocked the
taxiway, boarded passengers and refueled. The
KLM flight was eventually allowed to move,
but takeoff was initiated before a clearance
had been issued. The plane struck another
Boeing 747 that was taxing on the runway,
resulting in the worst accident ever in the
airline industry. During the takeoff roll, the
KLM flight crew warned the captain that they
might not have been cleared for takeoff and
that another plane might have been taxing on
the runway. However, the captain seemed to
be strongly convinced that they had been
cleared for takeoff and discarded the flight
crew’s comments.

•

Northwest Airlines 6231, Thiells, NY,
December 1st, 1974 – As the aircraft was
climbing in icing conditions, the pitot tube
became clogged by ice, so that the airspeed
indicator started working as an altimeter,
indicating increasing airspeed as the plane
climbed. The flight crew failed to recognize
the problem and instead believed, despite the
constant power setting and the climb attitude,
that the airspeed was in fact increasing. They
believed that this increase was due to the low
weight of the aircraft.
Their erroneous
interpretation lasted throughout the flight, until
the plane buffeted, stalled, and entered a rapid
descent. The flight crew apparently believed
that the buffeting was a high speed
phenomenon – Mach buffeting – rather than a
stall buffeting and neglected the possibility of
a stall despite the indication from the shaker
stick. The flight crew relied exclusively on the
air speed indicators and their related warning
systems, ignoring other pertinent cues pointing
to a different problem than the one originally
assessed.

lowered the landing gear, the light that
indicated that the nose landing gear has
lowered and locked failed to illuminate. The
crew chose to depart the airport airspace to the
west to assess the problem. The auto- pilot
was engaged, and they proceeded to evaluate
the indicator light and the gear status. As the
flight continued, the autopilot became
disengaged and a slight descent initiated.
Prolonged focus on the landing gear problem
prevented the flight crew from monitoring
altitude and the plane proceeded to descend,
eventually impacting the ground. The NTSB
found that the three flight crewmembers were
preoccupied in an attempt to ascertain the
position of the nose landing gear and therefore
neglected monitoring the flight instruments
(1973). Much like the crew involved in the
accident in Portland in 1978, this crew was
focused on the problem with the landing gear
and did not sample other cues relating to the
state of the aircraft. The flight crew did not
even hear the altitude alert which sounded as
the aircraft descended through 1, 750 feet
m.s.1., an indication that their resources were
entirely devoted to the landing gear.
Conclusions and Research Indications

•

Eastern Airlines 401, Everglades, FL,
December 29th, 1972 – As Eastern 401
approached Miami International Airport and

As illustrated in the accidents presented above,
cognitive tunneling likely played a role in several
aircraft crashes. In all of the accidents discussed
above, the pilot did not adequately perceive or
evaluate all pertinent information necessary to
successfully complete the flight because of filtering
based
on
preexisting
expectations,
initial
interpretations, or preoccupation with one aspect of
the flight. The dilemma is evident; however, the
solution is not so lucid. Prince et al. (1997) suggest
three remedies that can be applied to overcoming the
effects of stress in the cockpit: 1) redesign of
task/environment, 2) selection of crew based on
ability to withstand stressors, and 3) training, the
most reasonable intervention. Prince et al.. suggest
specific training techniques that appear promising
including: integrating specific behavioral techniques
designed to assist in dealing with stress, and
providing crews the opportunity to practice newly
acquired skills under condition of graded exposure to
stressors (1997). Glyn (1997) suggested developing
a comprehensive aircrew decision making seminar to
include awareness training and incorporate pertinent
research. In stead of presenting a specific formula
for optimal decision making, a range of different
decision types is presented along with the different
processes used in making a good decision (Glyn,
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1997). There are currently pilot training programs
that do incorporate stress management and decision
making training into their Crew Resource
Management (CRM) training (Prince et al., 1997).
However, alterations to these programs to include
awareness training of the phenomena that can occur
as a result of stress, such as cognitive tunneling, may
prove beneficial. By exposing pilots to the theories
and the research into the effects of stress on
performance, and by illustrating these effects through
previous accidents and occurrence in actual simulator
training, pilots’ susceptibility to it may decrease.
Further research on pilot training with respect to
stress and its effects is needed to better understand
how to cope with this issue.
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